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1. The red tape reduction mantra: strict interpretation of EC Law as a source of 
administrative burden 
 
In the last decade business and industry throughout Europe have complained bitterly 
about the administrative burden imposed by legislation. Administrative requirements 
resulting from domestic or EU legislation are an important determinant of the 
business environment, since businesses across the EU are obliged to spend 
considerable amounts of time filling in forms and reporting on a wide range of issues. 
In 2007 the costs thereof were estimated to amount to 3.5% of the GDP in the EU.
1
 
Obviously burdens like these impede economic growth, and inevitably throw up 
obstacles when trying to achieve the Lisbon targets the EU has set itself for the year 
2010.
2
 Reducing administrative burdens – or ‘cutting red tape’ 
3
 as it is also 
commonly labelled - has therefore become topical: it ties in well with economic 
policies, and has become a very popular electoral promise Europe wide. Red tape 
reduction is at the heart of a great deal of the regulatory reform projects that have 
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 Communication of the Commission COM (2007) 23 final, Action Programme for Reducing 
Administrative Burdens in the European Union, p.4. 
2 In March summit of 2000, the EU Heads of States and Governments in Lisbon agreed to make the EU 
‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010’. From the outset these targets 
have seemed somewhat overambitious. At present (2008) it is obvious that the targets set in 2000 will 
not be met by far. Seer for a sobering 2005 overview of the targets and the amount of (then) 25 that 
have met these targets. http://prawo.uni.wroc.pl/~kwasnicki/EkonLit1/the_quatifiable_lisbon.pdf. 
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 The origin of the term is not quite clear but it is generally held that ‘red tape’ refers to the 17th and 
18th century English practice of binding documents and official papers with red tape. Another 
explanation holds that the 19
th
 century records of US Civil War veterans were bound in red tape, which 
was particularly difficult to remove. 
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spread like wildfire throughout many EU member state countries.
4
 The European 
Commission itself has embarked on a Better Regulation strategy aiming for a 
reduction of administrative costs by as much as 25% by 2012. This would – it is 
believed - have a significant economic impact on the EU economy – and an increase 
in GDP of about 1.5% or around € 150 billion.
5
  
 Typically red tape reduction policies try to reduce administrative burden by 
way of screening the legislative stock and cutting away excessive burdens. In many 
EU countries however, one also aims to prevent disproportional burden from arising 
when drafting legislation. In this respect European legislation, especially EC 
Directives, come in to focus. EC Directives are believed to be a source of a great deal 
of red tape, both in themselves and indirectly. Businesses and industry in the UK and 
the Netherlands alike – until recently – believed that in the act of transposing a 
Directive, governments and government agencies were rather inclined to do more than 
what was strictly required by the Directive.  Exceeding the strict terms of EC 
Directives governments and agencies were suspected – wilfully
6
 or unconsciously - to 
“tag on” additional national measures on the back of European Directives, resulting in 
unnecessary burdens and competitive disadvantages for domestic businesses.  In the 
UK these national add-ons are commonly referred to as gold-plating.
7
 Burdens as a 
result of the transposition of EC directives into national law are not only kept in check 
by limiting the burden to the bare minimum required, but also by requiring a keen eye 
for the coordination of the regimes required by EC law and existing national regimes. 
So called ‘double-banking’, i.e. the situation when European legislation covers the 
same ground as existing domestic legislation, and where the two regimes have not 
been made fully consistent or merged into one, also needs to be avoided in order to 
circumvent unnecessary burdens for businesses and industry. 
 
1.1 Gold-plating, double banking and the interpretation of law 
                                                           
 
4 At present 23 Out of 27 EU Member states have regulatory reform projects underway 
http://www.administrative-burdens.com.  
See for  the EU-regulatory reform programme (the administrative burden reduction part). 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/admin_costs_en.htm. 
5 See the Commission’s Working Document, COM(2008) 35 final, Reducing administrative burdens in 
the European Union 2007 progress report and 2008 outlook. 
6
 In Italy this technique of piggybacking a Directive is believed to be often used as a device to pass 
through controversial measures and to ensure a lower degree of parliamentary scrutiny. 
7 The Dutch wording for this is: ‘nationale kop’. 
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For our present object of study ‘Interpretation of National Law in the context of 
transnational law’ the phenomena’s of gold-plating and double banking are very 
interesting. First, because transposition of EC directives is – to a very large extent – 
an act of interpretation. Under article 249 of the EC Treaty directives are binding as to 
the result to be achieved, but they leave national authorities a choice of methods. This 
allows the Member states a double margin of discretion: first, states are, within certain 
confines,
8
 free to choose form and methods, integrating EC legislation in the most 
optimal way into domestic legislation. Secondly the Member state needs to interpret 
the result to be achieved. Even though they are under the scrutiny of the European 
Commission, and ultimately the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as regards their 
interpretation, in most cases they have a significant margin of appreciation. The very 
nature of EC Directives as instruments of EC policymaking is such (at least originally 
the meaning was) that it allows member states to adjust their national regimes to the 
Directive as they see fit. This means that some room to manoeuvre must be left to the 
national authorities; an element of subsidiarity is present in the Directive instrument.  
Not that they are always used as such: a great deal of the present day Directives are 
cemented shut. That is why the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking 
2003
9
 in its points, and specifically point 13, calls upon the institutions not to use a 
Directive as if it were a regulation. This, as well as the tendency to over detail 
provisions, denatures the character of a Directive. 
 Second, gold-plating and double banking are interesting because they are 
relative concepts. The bite of gold-plating, for instance, only becomes painful when 
one Member state is overzealous in relation to another member state. A competitive 
disadvantage will present itself if this is the case. 
 Third, these phenomena are interesting in view of our present theme. When we 
discuss the interpretation of law (be it national or transnational) we tend to focus on 
judiciary interpretation. We study the way national judges interpret national law with 
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 There is a host of case law of the European Court of Justice as regards the proper forms and methods 
to achieve the results required. 
9
 Point 13 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking  OJ C 2003, 321, p. 1 reads: The 
three Institutions recall the definition of the term ‘directive’ (Article 249 of the EC Treaty) and the 
relevant provisions of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. In its proposals for directives, the Commission will ensure that a proper balance is 
struck between general principles and detailed provisions, in a manner that avoids excessive use of 
Community implementing measures. 
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an eye for what is happening at the transnational level (e.g. the doctrine of directive 
conform interpretation), or what is happening in other member states, or countries.
10
 
However, it is not only judges that interpret the law, and not every interpretation of 
national law in view of transnational law is subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Implementation of both national and transnational law requires interpretation of 
national (administrative) authorities. As regards the interpretation and implementation 
of EU legislation, national authorities tend recently to communicate and cooperate in 
formal and informal networks to learn from one another.
11
  
 Fourth, gold-plating and double banking are very topical, but were – until 
recently – not well researched. They were more or less “buzz” words popping up in 
public debates on red tape reduction. Everyone had an example, but no one quite 
knew how big the problem was.  
 
1.2 This contribution 
 
In 2006 and 2007 both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands – the vanguard 
countries of regulatory reform – decided to see whether the emperors of gold-plating 
and double banking actually wore clothes. On either side of the Channel, two teams 
were asked to review the existence and effect of these practices. This contribution 
deals, in a comparative way, with the reports that resulted from the reviews. The 
contribution especially focuses on the element of interpretation of EC Directives as a 
source of gold-plating. In conclusion this contribution will consider how gold-plating 
by way of interpretation can be controlled. 
 
2. The gold-plating conundrum in the UK: the Davidson review 
 
Ever since the 1990’s British businesses – spurred on by OECD-reports on the 
damaging effects of legislative burden – have been deeply concerned about the effect 
of red tape in respect of their competitiveness. This concern resulted in the 
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 See for instance Eyal Benvenisti (2008), Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and 
International Law by National Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102. 
11 A very well known one is The European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of 
Environmental Law (IMPEL) is the network of the environmental authorities of EU Member states. 
This network provides a framework for policy makers, environmental inspectors and enforcement 
officers to exchange ideas, and encourages the development of enforcement structures and best 
practices. See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/implementation_en.htm. 
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establishment of an independent body, the Better Regulation Task Force (BRT) in 
1997, whose mission was to advise government - on request or on its own accord – on 
matters pertaining to (unnecessary) regulatory and administrative burdens. The task 
force threw some heavy stones in to the pond when it estimated the total cost of 
regulation of the UK economy to be 10-12% of the GDP, or £100 billion, taking into 
account the related policy work. Already in its first reports the BRT targeted EC 
legislation as a possible source of red tape. It was at the very moment when the BRT 
was replaced by a permanent body, the Better Regulation Commission, on 1 January 
2006 that the Lord Chancellor of the Exchequer decided to take a more in-depth look 
into the existence and effects of gold plating and double banking. Lord Neil Davidson 
Q.C.
12
 was commissioned to conduct an independent review into the UK’s 
implementation of EU legislation, focusing on the issue of ‘over-implementation’. 
Over-implementation was used as an umbrella term for gold-plating, double banking 
and  “regulatory creep” denoting over-zealous enforcement due to lack of clarity 
about the objectives or status of regulations and guidance.
13
 
 The first item on the review agenda was to get to grips with the definitions of 
gold-plating and double banking (we will – for reasons of brevity - not deal with 
regulatory creep). As it happened, the UK Transposition Guide – a guide for policy-
makers and lawyers responsible for transposition issues in the UK
14
 – held a common 
definition for the two concepts. The Davidson review built on that and defined gold-
plating – in very broad terms - as the process of when implementation goes beyond 
the minimum necessary to comply with a Directive, by: 
• extending the scope, adding in some way to the substantive requirement, or 
substituting wider domestic legal terms for those used in the directive; or 
• not taking full advantage of any derogations which keep requirements to a 
minimum (e.g. for certain scales of operation, or specific activities); or 
• providing sanctions, enforcement mechanisms and matters such as burden of 
proof which go beyond the minimum needed (e.g. as a result of picking up 
the existing criminal sanctions in that area); or 
• implementing early, before the date given in the directive. 
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 Created a life peer on 22 March 2006 as Baron Davidson of Glen Clova. 
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 See Davidson Review (2006), Implementation of EC Legislation, Final report, p. 3. 
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 Cabinet Office (2005), Transposition guide: How to implement European directives effectively. 
London 2005 (revised in 2007). 
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The first two points in particular are interesting in light of the interpretative 
perspective we have chosen.  
 Double-banking – according to the definition of the Davidson Review - can 
occur when European legislation covers the same ground as existing domestic 
legislation, though possibly in different ways and to a varying extent, effectively 
resulting in a double (extra burdensome) regime – both European and domestic. 
 
2.1 Findings of the Review 
 
In order to find out whether the UK tends to gold plate (and double bank) more than 
other EU countries – as was suggested by some commentators
15
 - the Davidson 
Review adopted a multi-stage approach. In line with its terms of reference, the 
Review first launched a public call for evidence in the spring of 2006. The call asked 
businesses, organizations and the general public whether they thought over-
implementation was a significant issue for the UK and if so, what should be done 
about it. Subsequently it invited the addressees of the call to come up with examples 
of what to their mind were clear cut cases of over-implementation. This generated 160 
written responses from a wide range of respondents. These responses in turn were 
used as input for the selection of significant cases of potential over-implementation to 
be studied in more detail. Governmental departments, comparative insights, and 
external stakeholders assisted to the case study selection.  
 The Review debunks the idea that the UK is a systemic over achiever when it 
comes down to the transposition of EC Directives, as in the past some critics have 
argued, on the basis of comparison of transposition ratios (dividing the number of 
words in the national implementing legislation by the number of words in the original 
directive). The Review dismisses this simplistic and misconceived approach to 
assessing gold-plating: it totally fails to take account of whether elaboration of 
directives increases or reduces burdens for those being regulated.  
 In addition, the Review did not find any compelling evidence that the UK is 
systematically over-implementing. Over-implementation is an elusive concept, the 
Review noted, and there are as many myths as concrete examples. The Review 
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certainly found that assessing whether a particular piece of European legislation had 
been over-implemented and whether that over-implementation was justified is not 
straightforward: it requires careful research into the background and context.  
 The Review did find some examples of gold-plating and double banking. The 
Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) for instance has been gold-plated by 
extending the scope of the rules on sales of insurance so that they apply to sales by 
direct insurers as well as sales by insurance intermediaries. At the time of 
implementation (2002) this extension was widely supported by stakeholders, 
including the insurance industry, but at present the same industry has withdrawn its 
support because they think the regime is expensive and difficult to comply with, and 
is not really designed to deal with direct sales by insurers. Under the same Directive 
the national legislation also extends the scope to all motor warranties (where the 
Directive allows an exception for contracts costing less than 500 euros a year). The 
UK did not use the exception in order to avoid market distortions. This is widely 
accepted and the Review received no complaints about this. National implementation 
of the Insurance Mediation Directive, as well as that of the car safety test of the 
Ministry of Transport (commonly known as the MOT-test),
 16
 provide examples of 
gold-plating by imposing higher standards than the Directive itself imposes. Directive 
91/328/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
roadworthiness test for motor vehicles and their trailers imposes a regime that – 
basically – allows for a bi-annual test of seasoned cars, while the UK regime requires 
an annual test. At face value this is over-implementation by way of gold-plating but 
the Review then asks itself the question whether the over-implementation is justified 
and whether it creates a competitive disadvantage. The Review concludes that in the 
recent past other EU countries, notably Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia 
have had the same testing pattern as the UK, but that the Netherlands in 2008 were 
moving toward the minimum regime of the Directive, which, making the UK case of 
MOT testing in turn – a relative – example of problematic gold-plating. 
 
 The Davidson Review gives still more examples of gold-plating and some of 
double banking (Consumer Sales directive, Fisheries regulation, Waste and IPPC 
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regulation, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts directive) but – on the basis of the 
evidence – holds that even the few examples (out of the 160 reports) expressing 
inappropriate over-implementation may not be as big a problem – in absolute terms 
and relative to other EU countries – as is sometimes believed.
17
 A number of factors 
seem to indicate that over-implementation is not all that serious a threat.  
 
First of all a great deal of the respondents answering to the call of evidence 
complained about issues which were not about over-implementation in the UK, but 
about EU legislation itself. In general many of the allegations regarding over-
implementation are misplaced and often represent concerns about other issues. Even 
when some over-implementation does occur, it is sometimes beneficial for the UK 
economy to maintain regulatory standards rather than the minimum requirements of 
European Legislation. Many businesses that operate across Europe reported that 
differential implementation across Member States, thereby undermining the single 
market, matters more than whether there is over-implementation in a particular 
country. The idea of over-implementation and rigorous enforcement of the UK in 
relation to other EU Members States is persistent in business and industry, although 
the Review did not come across any hard evidence to support these assertions. 
Perceptions of under-implementation of other countries are widespread however – 
even in the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain and Germany, countries that were also 
involved in the Reviews research.
18
 The World Bank and the OECD in 2007 reported 
that the UK has one of the most favourable regulatory environments of doing business 
in the EU, which does not support the idea or suspicion that the UK overburdens 
business on a large scale when implementing EU legislation. 
 
The Davidson Review gives a well balanced portrait of gold-plating and double 
banking, demonstrating how the process of elaboration of national law in order to 
implement EU legislation sometimes results in gold-plating or double banking, but 
not as a systemic process nor as a general intent. In most of the 160 reported cases no 
over-implementation as such was found and where it was found it was in most cases 
for good reason. The Review however does recommend that to undo some gold-
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plating and double banking, the central one (i.e. the EU country with the biggest 
economic yield) be encouraged to change the MOT testing pattern bringing it back to 
bi-annual testing. 
 
3. The search for golden rims in the Netherlands – the Europe-Asser Institute-
report 
Parallel to the Davidson Review a similar review was held in the Netherlands. In 2005 
and 2006 the Ministry of Economic Affairs commissioned a research project into 
over-implementation in the Netherlands. A group of researchers and experts from 
Leiden’s European Institute and the Hague-based Asser Institute analysed 119 reports 
of alleged over-implementation.
19
  The Dutch team used an approach comparable to 
the Davidson Review but deployed a less sophisticated working definition of over-
implementation. Over-implementation occurs according to the Europe-Asser Institute 
when: 
An EC-directive has been transposed correctly into Dutch Law and the Dutch 
regulatory regime goes beyond the minimum requirements imposed by the 
Directive.  
Like the definition of the Davidson Review the definition is inspired by a common 
definition stemming from drafting guidelines (the Dutch Drafting Guidelines).
 20
 
 
As a result of better regulation initiatives of the Balkenende-II and –III 
administrations
21
 a first call for evidence of over-implementation had already been 
issued in 2005. It yielded some 105 reports of potential over-implementation. On 
request of the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer van de Staten-
Generaal) – who wished to secure that all possible over-implementation came to the 
surface - a new inventory was drawn up assisted by the European-Asser Institute 
groups. The second call yielded 119 reports. These reports were analysed and 
screened by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In more than a third of the reports (42) 
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 See P.J. Slot, W.J.M. Voermans, S.F. Blockmans, M.K. Bulterman, M. van der Harst, S.A.L. 
Josaputra, B. Platell, P. Willemsen, A. Cuyvers, S.H. Romein, M. Park, H. Park (2007), Nationale 
koppen op EG-regelgeving (Over-implementation of EC Legislation), Leiden/Den Haag. 
20 Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving (Dutch Drafting Guidelines 1992). Article 347 of these Guidelines 
– in the somewhat criptic official translation - reads: ‘No other rules will be included in the 
implementation rule other than necessary for the implementation.’ 
21
 See W. Voermans, The Sisyphus paradox of cutting red tape and managing public risk. Utrecht Law 
Review, 4 (3), pp. 128-144. 
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it was directly apparent that they did not constitute any over-implementation. The 77 
remaining reports of alleged over-implementation were handed over to the research 
team for closer study.  
 
Like the Davidson Review the Dutch report did not find conclusive evidence of 
widespread or deliberate over-implementation. In fact only 18 cases of outright over-
implementation were found and 11 debatable ones. Again, as with the Davidson 
Review, most of the true cases of over-implementation were justified and not very 
serious or damaging to the competitiveness of Dutch industry or businesses.  
 
As regards our current topic of ‘interpretation’ the Dutch team encountered some 10 
cases of over-implementation. Two of these examples resulted from widening the 
scope of the Directive underlying the implementation. The first concerns the 
implementation of EC Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity, in which Dutch legislation effectively protects private 
consumers at the cost of the supplier where the Directive does not. The second 
concerns Regulation 561/2006/EC on the harmonisation of certain social legislation 
relating to road transport. The regulation imposes a regime for truck driving and 
resting hours for vehicle categories with a permissible mass over 3500 kg. Dutch 
legislation equally applies this regime to vehicle categories between 500-3500 kg, 
thus constituting over-implementation.  
  
4. Golden plates and red herrings: a common heritage  
 
Gold-plating and double banking have become catch phrases in the regulatory reform 
debates throughout Europe. They convey the evocative notion that over zealous 
governments are systematically hurting domestic business and industry by over-
implementing EC legislation, where other member states are not. Recent research in 
both the UK and the Netherlands shows that – although over-implementation is 
elusive and hard to assess – no wide spread or systematic practices of over-
implementation exist. What is apparent from both projects is that perceptions of over 
implementation in one’s own country and suspected under-implementation in other 
countries are widespread and tenacious.  
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Although over-implementation is not wide spread it does occur, only with less 
damaging effect to business and industry than is commonly believed. Businesses and 
industries that operate throughout Europe seems to suffer more from differentiated 
implementation in different countries than from over-implementation at home. In 
most cases over-implementation is – even to the present day – justifiable. In view of 
this evidence one might wonder whether the discussion on over implementation is not 
a red herring. To our minds, this would be a hastily conclusion: there may possibly be 
a deeper point to the complaints voiced in the over-implementation debate. Over-
implementation has an absolute aspect to it (doing more than is strictly necessary) but, 
as the Davidson Review reveals, a relative aspect too (are we doing more than other 
EU countries). When implementing, EC member states may well keep within the 
margins of over-implementation (avoiding gold-plating, double banking etc.) but the 
implementing domestic legislation may be suboptimal for business and industry 
anyway in view of what other countries are doing. The Davidson Review hinted at 
this by comparing the MOT-regime to that in other Member States. Along these lines 
business and industry may have a lot to gain by comparing the way their domestic 
legislature has implemented EC legislation to that of other member states. Best 
practices of implementation may prove to be the future goldmines of regulatory 
reform. They are to be preferred over the tar pits of suspicion of neighbourly under-
implementation. 
 
 
